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Abstract
The 14th century has traditionally been considered a century of crisis, unrest and political breakdown around Europe, given the pre-
ponderance of wars, civil clashes and skirmishes with external enemies. In the Kingdom of Valencia, too, we can find these constant 
struggles for land and power, yet at the same time, just like all over Europe, we can also witness the gradual growth of the institutions 
of administration, governance and justice spearheaded by the Crown and the different political actors. Indeed, this process of political 
development did not preclude violence, but it did establish the foundations of a powerful institutional system which gained ground 
throughout the 15th century.
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In November 1300, James II reached the city of Valencia 
and ordered Valencia’s royal universities to send armed 
peons to the Castilian land of Murcia, which the mon-
arch’s forces had just occupied, taking advantage of the 
fact that Ferdinand IV of Castile was still a minor. Just a 
few years later, the northern part of the region of Murcia, 
from Alicante to Oriola, where half of the population was 
Muslim, had joined the Kingdom of Valencia, substan-
tially enlarging the borders that James I had established 
decades earlier.1 In June 1398, however, the city of Valen-
cia organised and led a military campaign against the 
Zayyanid emirate of Tlemcen in the Maghreb, with an ex-
pedition of 30 armed vessels and 7,500 combatants. 
Known as the “Holy Armada”, this expedition was in re-
taliation for the Muslim sacking of the Valencian town of 
Torreblanca in the northern part of the kingdom the pre-
vious year.2 On the other hand, at the beginning of the 
century, the kingdom’s legal and institutional system was 
still under dispute, since the majority of the nobles reject-
ed it. This became clear in a conflict with the royal bor-
oughs over the territory’s tax contribution in 1315: “most 
of the other nobles, knights and infançons are not, nor do 
they want to be, with these universities in a fur (legal 
code), that is, in the fur of Valencia, under which all of 
these universities and this kingdom are populated”.3 To 
the contrary, one century later, despite the dire political 
strife that divided Valencians into two factions upon the 
death of Martin the Humane in 1410, the different parlia-
ments organised by each side to decide on the succession 
of the Crown claimed to speak on behalf of “the entire 
community of the kingdom” and, in fact, they were clear-
ly comprised of different estates.4
Therefore, during that century, Valencia had gone from 
a territory still coalescing, created by James I in the mid-
13th century with the conquest of the former Islamic taifas 
of Valencia, Xàtiva and Denia and expanded a few decades 
later with the aforementioned counties of Murcia, to an-
other with fully consolidated borders that would remain 
virtually unaltered until 1707.5 It had also gone from a 
country in which the Muslim population was as large as 
the Christian to one in which Muslims were in the minor-
ity, around one-third, even though they still played a cru-
cial role for the elites, since the Muslim inhabitants were 
more intensely exploited than the Christians because of 
their ethnic identity.6 Likewise, it had already taken the 
step from being a kingdom in which the leading nobles de-
fied the legal order as the monarch and royal boroughs 
tried to impose their designs, to one led, yet still strongly 
disputed, by the elites in the city of Valencia. Indeed, this 
city, along with Catalonia and Aragon, had become the 
nerve centre of an economic, political and institutional 
system that had carved an important niche for itself among 
the states that were shaping the future of the Crown.
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In short, despite the known bumps in the road caused 
by wars, shortages and epidemics, the 14th century was 
actually a century of growth and overall political develop-
ment, especially in the Kingdom of Valencia, which had 
been founded just shortly before. However, this growth 
and development was marred by conflict both with exter-
nal enemies and among internal political agents, a com-
mon phenomenon around Europe, as recently noted by 
John Watts.7 This is why in our brief survey of political 
power in Valencia during the 14th century – its least-
known century – we shall analyse not only the leading fig-
ures who managed the administrative mechanisms and 
decisions on the population, namely the Crown and the 
three estates of the Kingdom (the Church, the nobility 
and the royal universities or municipalities with their 
own local government), but also the events that sparked 
the external and internal disputes while also shaping a 
powerful administrative structure and a clear collective 
regional consciousness. To this end, we shall examine not 
only the material and jurisdictional foundations of each 
of these agents but also the gradual institutionalisation of 
their power.
The power of the Crown
In the Furs de València (Charter of Valencia), the region-
al code of law officially promulgated in the first Courts of 
the Kingdom of Valencia held in 1261, James I (r. 1213-
1276) claimed that “at the beginning all things were of our 
domain and did not reach those who would take them 
and receive them for reasons of either religion nor 
Church, such that they must always be called and judged 
as a royal estate”.8 This Catalan-Aragonese monarch was 
certainly acting very differently than he had done shortly 
before in Mallorca and Ibiza, where even prior to begin-
ning the conquest campaigns he had agreed to divvy up 
the land and jurisdictions with a series of feudal magnates 
including the Count of Roussillon, the Count of Empúries, 
the Viscount of Bearn, the Bishop of Barcelona and the 
Archbishop-elect of Tarragona.9 In contrast, during the 
1231 to 1245 conquest of the Islamic lands that became 
the Kingdom of Valencia, James I served as the absolute 
peak of the feudal pyramid and distributed the occupied 
domains according to his own designs. What is more, 
even though during the early phases of the war he had to 
divvy up most of the occupied lands among the nobility, 
knights, prelates and military orders of Catalonia and 
Aragon which had helped him militarily, after the con-
quest of the city of Valencia in 1238, he allowed himself, 
now enormously strengthened, the luxury of keeping al-
most the entire area that stretched towards the southern 
boundary of the new kingdom for himself.10
In this way, almost half of the kingdom was directly in 
his hands in the mid-13th century. His leadership in the 
conquest had led the monarch to gain an exceptional 
point of departure to impose his power over the inhabit-
ants as a whole, since in addition to the main towns he 
also retained extensive stretches of the territory. This was 
the backdrop when he also tried to impose his full legal 
domain, as we shall see below. However, after the end of 
the century that vast land mainly went to the Church and 
especially the nobility, particularly after the 1320s, in line 
with the rise in military financing needs and the very roy-
al policy of creating a sympathetic nobility. On the one 
hand, the cost of the Crown’s campaigns after the con-
quest of Sicily in 1282 and especially the series of wars 
that ran practically uninterrupted after the occupation of 
Sardinia in 1323 was that the monarchs from Peter the 
Great (r. 1276-1282) to Peter the Ceremonious (r. 1336-
Figure 1. Evolution of the realms in the Kingdom of Valencia, 1248-1370.
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1. Aín
2. Albalat de la Ribera
3. Albocàsser
4. Alboraia
5. tinença de l’Alcalatén
6. L’Alcúdia
7. Alfafara
8. Alfarb
9. Almàssera
10. Almassora
11. Altura
12. Andilla
13. Aranyonal and les Cingles, Fredes, 
el Boixar and Coratxar (Benifassà)
14. Ares del Maestrat
15. Assúevar, Mosquera and Pellinos
16. Atzeneta del Maestrat
17. Barracas
18. Begís
19. Benafer
20. Benaguasil
21. Benassal
22. Benicarló
23. Benigafull (Vall d’Uixó)
24. Benimodo and Ressalany
25. Borriana, Beniham, Seca and 
la Jova
26. Borriol
27. Bunyol
28. Carlet and Massalet
29. Castell de Cabres, Vilanova and 
Mola Escabossa
30. Castelló de Rugat
31. Catí
32. Caudiel
33. Cortes d’Arenós
34. les Coves de Vinromà
35. Culla
36. Domenyo
37. Eslida
38. Fanzara
39. Fondeguilla
40. la Font d’en Carrós
41. Forcall
42. Herbers
43. Llombai
44. Loriguilla
45. Macastre
46. Manises
47. Mascarell (Nules)
48. Moixent
49. Montroi
50. Oliva
51. Orxeta
52. Padull and les Dotze (Bocairent)
53. Pardines (Beniarjó)
54. Paterna
55. Pedralba
56. Pina
57. Planes
58. Pobla d’Arenós
59. Pobla de Vallbona
60. Polpís
61. la Salzadella
62. Segairent (Sueca)
63. Serra
64. Sinarques
65. Sogorb
66. Sollana and Trullars
67. Soneixa
68. Sorita
69. Sot de Xera
70. Sueiquia (Xàtiva)
71. Suera
72. Tírig
73. Toixa
74. Torís and Fondos
75. el Toro
76. Torres
77. Vall d’Alba
78. Vall de Càrcer
79. Vallibona
80. Veo and Xinquer
81. Vilafamés
82. Vilafermosa
83. Vilafranca del Maestrat
84. Vilamalefa
85. Vilamarxant
86. Vilanova d’Alcolea
87. Vilar de Canes
88. Vila-real
89. Vinarós
90. Vistabella
91. Viver
92. Xella
93. Xelva
94. Xèrica
95. Xest
96. Xestalgar
97. Xirell (Cortes de Pallàs)
98. Xóvar
99. Alpont
100. Castellfabib
101. Morella
Town adhered to the Fueros de Aragón
Town adhered to other codes of law
Unknown
Town adhered to the Fueros de Aragón 
and later changed to the Furs de València
Figure 2. Distribution of the Fueros de Aragón and the Furs de València during the 13th century.
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1387) had to sell many of their possessions in order to get 
funds. On the other hand, the participants in those con-
flicts, such as Roger de Llúria and Bernat de Sarrià, were 
also rewarded with major domains, as were certain mem-
bers of the royal family, like queens and princes, who thus 
occupied the highest echelon of the nobility in the King-
dom of Valencia. As a result, by the 1360s the monarchy’s 
possessions had been vastly reduced, and barely 10% of 
Valencian territory belonged to the king, a situation that 
would not begin to be redressed until the end of the cen-
tury (see Figure 1).11
On the other hand, beyond its material foundations, 
the evolution of the Crown’s jurisdictional power was 
similar, going from a highly favourable point of departure 
to a somewhat disadvantageous endpoint during the 14th 
century. Specifically, in the early days of James I’s con-
quest, he divided the occupied domains primarily among 
the Aragonese nobility and knights and allowed them to 
populate them with their own Fueros de Aragón (the code 
of laws from Aragon), just as he had allowed to apply the 
Usatges de Barcelona (the code of laws from Catalonia) to 
the majority of Catalans who had conquered Mallorca 
and Ibiza. However, the king totally shifted tack after con-
quering the city of Valencia in 1238 and publishing an ex-
tensive code of laws called the Costums de València which 
he sought to impose over the entire kingdom, just as he 
promulgated them in the subsequent Courts of 1261 un-
der the name of the Furs de València. His intention was 
clear: to increase the power of the Crown and the royal 
estate over the people, lands and things through a new set 
of laws that claimed to extend over the entire territory at 
the expense of the authority of the other lords, despite the 
fact that practically half of the kingdom, especially the 
northern and inland regions, was populated under the 
Fueros de Aragón (see Figure 2).12
Firstly, acceptance of Valencia’s laws meant acknowl-
edging the monarch’s pre-eminence when exercising cer-
tain prerogatives of justice, while inversely, keeping the 
Fueros de Aragón allowed the lords to avoid interference 
in their judicial decisions. Likewise, the choice of one 
code of laws over another also determined the possibility 
of establishing monopolies and taxes: if the Furs de 
València were accepted, the king had the monopoly on 
installing mills, oil presses, ovens, taverns or grain ex-
changes and selling salt, while he could also demand the 
payment of tolls, portage taxes, grazing taxes, redemp-
tions from the army and other similar collections. To the 
contrary, if the Fueros de Aragón were maintained, the 
lords had the right to all of this. Similarly, access to natu-
ral resources was also at stake: in the Furs de València the 
king declared the free use of all forests, rivers, pasture-
lands and quarries in the kingdom, with special powers 
for the residents of the city of Valencia, which the Aragon-
ese lords rejected, as they wanted to maintain private use 
of everything that lay inside their domains.
In consequence, James I’s decision in 1261 sparked a 
true power struggle between the nobility of Valencia with 
Aragonese roots, the majority at the time, and the Crown 
and the royal estate of Valencia. Indeed, the dispute esca-
lated to a civil war in the 1280s and significantly obstruct-
ed political relations until the Courts of 1329-1330, where 
an intermediate solution was reached: the vast majority of 
nobles who applied the Fueros de Aragón consented to 
adopting the Furs de València, while Alphonse the Be-
nign (r. 1327-1335) and the royal estate agreed to amend 
the Furs de València to recognise the concession of the 
“mixtum imperium” for all lords who had landholdings 
populated with a minimum of fifteen Christian families 
or seven Muslim families. The king also gave up monopo-
lies and exactions of rights outside his direct domains, 
while the use of natural resources remained in dispute, as 
we shall discuss below. In short, the lords gained much of 
the jurisdiction over their domains, except the rulings 
that entailed penalties of mutilation or death, which re-
mained in the hands of royal justice, with the exception of 
cases in which an express concession of “merum imperi-
um” had been made by the king.
Therefore, the Crown had to give up the sweeping ju-
risdictional aspirations sought by James I in the mid-13th 
century, a fact which was aggravated by the constant 
transmission of “meri imperii” throughout the 14th cen-
tury, in line with the aforementioned process of disposal 
of the royal assets. However, despite this, the legal situa-
tion of the monarchs was ultimately much more benefi-
cial for their interests than it was in Aragon, for example, 
as clearly stated by a royal official in the late 15th century: 
“His royal majesty knows to what extent the Fueros de 
Aragón notably derogate the royal pre-eminences and 
constrain royal authority, contrary to the Furs de Valèn-
cia, which are very obedient to the royal pre-eminences 
and do not curtail royal authority”.13 On the other hand, 
despite the fact that the Crown’s favourable initial situa-
tion gradually eroded, we should also bear in mind that 
during the 14th century it gained via the development of 
an administration that not only tended to its direct do-
mains but also acted with increasing authority and legiti-
macy as the maximum body of governance and justice.
First of all, since the mid-13th century there had been a 
general bailiff chosen by the king, for the length of time he 
wished, who was in charge of receiving and tallying the 
emoluments from his direct domains via a network of 
subordinate local bailiffs, who were chosen by the official 
himself, at least in the 14th century, when a general bailiff 
just for the former Castilian lands around Oriola was also 
established. Specifically, the bailiffs were in charge of col-
lecting the revenues, urban taxes, monopolies and ordi-
nary taxes paid in the royal boroughs, as well as the penal-
ties and compositions imposed by the justices – the royal 
justice officials on a municipal level – and the tariffs ap-
plied to exports. What is more, they tried to enforce the 
bans on exports for certain products, were in charge of 
the sound physical condition of the royal castles, and 
worked as appeal judges in minor cases which involved 
Jews and Muslims from the royal domain, as ordinary 
Catalan Historical Review 10.indb   30 17/07/17   12:55
Political power in the Kingdom of Valencia during the 14th century. Breakdown or development? Cat. Hist. Rev. 10, 2017   31
judges at the voluntary request of both parties, or as spe-
cial judges assigned by the king in any kind of lawsuit.14 In 
this sense, even though the post has not been studied in 
depth for the 14th century, a survey of the account books 
and revenue inventories that we possess indicates that 
they were being given more and more responsibilities. 
For example, while the general bailiff collected around 
222,000 solidi from Valencia, Xàtiva, Morella, Morvedre, 
Alzira, Castelló de la Plana, Borriana, Llíria, Ontinyent, 
Cullera, Alpont, Castellfabib, Ademús, Biar, Xixona and 
the Muslim community of Uixó in 1315, one century lat-
er, in 1415, the sum from these same estates owned by the 
king totalled 515,000 solidi as a result of not only the 
growth in agricultural production and business transac-
tions but also the penalties imposed by the bailiffs and 
justices.15
In fact, throughout the 14th century we can detect an 
increase in the status of the general bailiff of the Kingdom 
of Valencia; it was a job occupied by jurists without a no-
ble title during the first part of the century, while during 
the second it started to shift to knights from families such 
as the Boïl, Pardo de la Casta and Marrades. On the other 
hand, the aforementioned justices were officials chosen 
by the monarch from a list of three presented by the mu-
nicipal council of each royal boroughs, who served as or-
dinary judges of the Crown in the sweeping jurisdictional 
townships of the king’s landholdings. Obviously, the 
“mixtum” or “merum imperium” of the domains within 
those townships remained in the hands of the respective 
lords who owned them, yet the justices nonetheless oper-
ated as their appeal courts, and their activity also seemed 
to increase throughout the century, as proven by the fact 
that in 1321 the institution in the city of Valencia had to 
be split into one justice for criminal cases and another for 
civil cases and this last one was split into one justice 
for civil cases worth no more than 30 solidi (later 50 solidi 
and even later 300 solidi) and another justice for the other 
civil cases.16
Outside the royal boroughs, the power of the Crown 
was exerted over the entire territory via the figure of the 
attorney general of the Kingdom of Valencia, an official 
chosen by the monarch for the length of time he wished. 
This post came to be called the governor general after the 
mid-14th century, when, just like the general bailiff, there 
was a different attorney-general’s office or government 
for the southern region of Oriola. In fact, even though we 
do not know much about the evolution of the post during 
the second half of the century, that was apparently when 
the governor general’s competences stabilised as the del-
egated authority who often substituted for the king. He 
was the supreme commander of the royal armies, received 
the homages, held authority over the castles in fief, mili-
talyry summoned the same feudatories of the Crown and 
defended the integrity and peace of the territory against 
external enemies and outlaw gangs. He also worked as an 
appeals judge in the second instance, resolved cases of 
“merum imperium” – which implied mutilation or the 
death penalty – in the domains where this power had not 
been transferred, in the case of both Christians and Jews 
and Muslims, and issued rulings in fiscal causes which in-
volved a royal official and in “causes consistorials” (mu-
nicipal causes) in which one of the parties was a royal mu-
nicipality. In fact, his court of justice was the remote 
ancestor of the later Royal Audience of Valencia.17
Regarding the person chosen to occupy the post of at-
torney or governor, at the peak of the royal administra-
tion in the 14th century it tended to be a high-ranking 
nobleman, with a brief period of exception during the 
1350s, when it was limited to knights in order to ensure 
their obedience after the revolt of the Union. However, 
regardless of the individual who held the post, through-
out the course of the century we can also seem to detect a 
stabilisation and increase in their activity all over the 
kingdom, with the central seats in Valencia and Oriola 
and two others in Borriana and Xàtiva that depended on 
Valencia. Indeed, this development was accompanied by 
the juridical territorialisation of the Furs de València 
which we saw above, as well as the transfer to Valencian 
lands of other unique posts centralised in the royal court 
at the turn of the century: the vice-chancellery – Domin-
go Mascó was the first vice-chancellor assigned exclusive-
ly to the affairs of Valencia in 1387; the office of the Mas-
ter Rational – Berenguer Minguet was appointed the 
Master Rational (magister racionalis) of the Kingdom of 
Valencia in 1419, even though there had been special del-
egates for Valencia since the end of the previous century; 
and the archives of the royal administration.18
In short, over the course of the 14th century, despite 
the economic and political difficulties experienced by the 
Crown, the fact is that its governance was spreading, in-
tensifying and institutionalising in the Kingdom of Va-
lencia thanks to the acceptance of the Furs de València 
and the notable development of the royal courts of justice 
and key posts such as the general bailiff, the general gov-
ernor, the vice-chancellor and the Master Rational, with 
all their ancillary administrative structures. The Crown 
directly owned fewer assets than in the 13th century, but 
the legitimacy and stability of its power had increased by 
being disputed, agreed upon, mediatised and shared by 
the other social sectors around the territory.
The power of the estates
At the time that the Kingdom of Valencia was created in 
1238, the Courts had sporadically been meeting in Cata-
lonia and Aragon for a few decades with the participation 
of the Church, the nobility and increasingly frequently 
the royal universities. Although they had not yet attained 
the monarch’s political and control authorities that they 
would gradually acquire after the end of the 13th century, 
they did already exist as a forum where the leading politi-
cal agents from each territory could assemble.19 In the 
case of the Kingdom of Mallorca, James I and his succes-
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sors did not decide to call Courts of their own, but instead 
the Mallorcans had to go to the Courts in Catalonia, when 
they did attend Courts. Valencia did not seem to have any 
Courts of its own at first – at least there are no traces that 
the 1238 Costums de València were made public at an as-
sembly of the Courts but instead at a simple gathering of 
magnates and leaders from Catalonia and Aragon – until 
James I decided to summon the first Courts of Valencia in 
1261 in an attempt to impose the validity of the Furs de 
València over the entire territory with the approval of all 
the estates.20 The fact that the new kingdom had Courts of 
its own makes Valencia stand out from the other late me-
diaeval conquests on the Iberian Peninsula and triggered 
a particular political jostling among the different mem-
bers of the estates that received lands and gradually coa-
lesced inside the Kingdom of Valencia.
The Church
Among the magnates that signed the publication of the 
Costums de València in 1238, there were seven prelates: 
four Catalans, the archbishop of Tarragona and the bish-
ops of Barcelona, Vic and Tortosa, along with three from 
Aragon, the bishops of Zaragoza, Huesca and Tarazona.21 
Obviously, the network of church dioceses and parishes 
and establishments of the military, monastic and mendi-
cant orders had not yet developed in Valencia, although 
they would in the coming decades. However, a series of 
men of the Church specifically from Valencia were sum-
moned to the Courts of 1301-1302, namely the bishop and 
council of canons of the cathedral of Valencia and the ab-
bots of Benifassà and Valldigna, who were joined by the 
bishops of Tortosa and of Albarracín-Sogorb and the mas-
ters of the Temple and the Hospital from the Crown of 
Aragon, who also held lands in the Kingdom of Valencia.22
First of all, the diocese of Valencia, which was a suffra-
gan of the archdiocese of Tarragona, was far and away the 
largest in the territory, although it had to share with the 
diocese of the Catalan city of Tortosa, which had received 
an extensive church demarcation in the northern part of 
the kingdom as the result of a previous promise from the 
monarch, and with another diocese that had two sees, the 
Aragonese city of Albarracín and the Valencian city of 
Sogorb, which was, nonetheless, actually small and not 
very well endowed. What is more, after the incorporation 
of the southern lands near Oriola in 1308, the bishop of 
Cartagena, the diocese to which it belonged, also held 
competences in the Kingdom of Valencia, although he 
was never part of the Church estate of the Courts since he 
was from Castile and thus constantly embattled with the 
leaders from Oriola, who wanted a diocese of their own. 
On the other hand, the military orders established in Cat-
alonia and Aragon also received domains in Valencia, es-
pecially the Orders of the Temple and the Hospitallers in 
the northern part, most of which were folded into the new 
Order of Montesa, which was founded in 1319 as the out-
come of disappearance of the Templars and was exclusive 
to Valencia. Finally, during the 13th century, only two 
large Cistercian monasteries were founded: the one in 
Benifassà, with domains in the mountainous north, and 
the one in Valldigna, on the kingdom’s central coast. The 
Mercedarians also created a monastery in Santa Maria del 
Puig in 1240, the Carthusians in Portaceli and Valldecrist 
in 1272 and 1385, and the Hieronymites in Cotalba in 
1388. However, given that they were redemptive or en-
closed orders, they did not participate in the major politi-
cal debates.23
Therefore, the Church was a weak estate as a whole 
throughout the 14th century: few in number, with not 
very large domains and a somewhat secondary role, un-
like the situation in Aragon and especially in Catalonia, 
where there were archbishoprics (the one in Zaragoza 
since 1318 and the one in Tarragona since its conquest in 
the 12th century), and larger, more politically active 
bishoprics and abbeys (Zaragoza, Huesca and Tarazona 
or Montearagón, San Juan de la Peña, San Victorián, 
Veruela, Rueda and Piedra in Aragon; and Tarragona, 
Elna, Lleida, Urgell, Vic, Barcelona, Lleida and Tortosa, 
and Ripoll, Amer, Santes Creus, Poblet, Sant Miquel de 
Cuixà, Sant Cugat del Vallès, Banyoles, Besalú, Vilaber-
tran, Sant Feliu de Guíxols and Sant Joan de les Abadess-
es in Catalonia). In fact, the Church estate of the Valen-
cian Courts remained stable throughout the entire 
century, and the Courts were still attended by the same 
members as in 1301-1302, with the occasional addition 
of the commanders of the Castilian order of Santiago, 
which held possessions in the Kingdom of Valencia, and 
the Order of the Hospital, which had retained the do-
main of Torrent near the capital of Valencia.24 Likewise, 
regarding its territorial coverage, the Church domains 
never managed to hold more than 15% of the entire king-
dom and an even smaller percentage of the population, 
since the only establishment with truly abundant posses-
sions was the Order of Montesa, created – as mentioned 
above – in 1319; in fact, it was the largest Valencian sei-
gneurial estate in the period, with more than 60 towns 
and around 30,000 vassals.25
This is why we should stress that the masters of Monte-
sa did play an extremely important political role through-
out the century, generally showing steadfast support for 
and concurrence with the Crown, which had founded it. 
This is shown by the fact that the master Pere de Tous was 
in charge of organising the royalist side that sought to put 
down the revolt of the Union waged in 1347.26 Likewise, 
given the vast size of their Church jurisdiction and their 
important symbolic role as the leading prelates in the 
kingdom, the bishops of Valencia also engaged in notable 
political activity, either as collaborators with the Crown 
(as advisors and chancellors), as middlemen among the 
different social agents, such as in the dispute between the 
supporters of the Furs de València and the Fueros de 
Aragón, or as a party directly involved in political strug-
gles, especially during the bishopric of Jaume of Aragon, 
the grandson of James II and cousin of Peter the Ceremo-
nious, between 1369 and 1396.27 In any event, as men-
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tioned above, despite the utmost importance of the 
Church in mediaeval society and the fact that the prelates 
also participated in the disputes over the ownership of do-
mains, the Church estate of Valencia never played as sig-
nificant, manifest a political role as it did in other Europe-
an territories because of its initial status and evolution 
compared to the noble and royal estates.
The nobility
The eleven noble magnates who signed the Costums de 
València in 1238 were all either Catalan (Ramon Folch de 
Cardona, Pere de Montcada, Guillem de Montcada, Ra-
mon de Peralta and Ramon Berenguer d’Àger) or Aragon-
ese (Pedro Fernández de Azagra, Artal de Luna, Pedro 
Cornel, Jimeno de Urrea, Jimeno Pérez and García Ro-
meo).28 In this case, most of them were from Aragon, as 
were those in the noble estate during the early decades in 
the development of the Kingdom of Valencia because of 
their prominent participation in the early phases of the 
conquest. In fact, as mentioned above, the first lands 
handed out by James I, especially in the northern and in-
land regions of Valencia, were primarily populated by 
Aragonese laws, a situation which was fated to create a 
strong party coalescing around the defence of those laws 
starting in 1261, when the monarch himself tried to im-
pose the Furs de València everywhere. Despite this, the 
fact is that the inherited nobility in Valencia was usually 
characterised by its weakness compared to its counter-
parts in Catalonia and Aragon.
Indeed, in Catalonia there was a vigorous titled nobili-
ty, such as the counts of Roussillon, Empúries, Urgell, 
Pallars and Ribagorça and the viscounts of Bas, Cabrera, 
Rocabertí, Castellnou and Vilamur. Meanwhile, noble 
power in Aragon had reached the point of instating a 
caste of wealthy men or barons on whom a dense feudal-
vassalic network of knights and infançons depended, 
forming two different estates in the Courts, the upper no-
bility and the petty nobility. In fact, even though founding 
myths were created in Catalonia and Aragon that framed 
the nobility as the origin of the country, such as the 
knights who accompanied Otger Cataló and the moun-
tain men “who won the lands without king”, in the King-
dom of Valencia “James I first, he of the glorious memo-
ry” was always conjured as the true father of the country.29 
His leadership and favourable starting position at the 
time of the conquest, particularly after 1238, certainly 
prevented the Valencian nobility from ever getting exces-
sively powerful. Indeed, the Crown tended to hand out 
medium-sized or small realms – some of them extremely 
small – and avoided creating noble titles specific to Va-
lencia, which did not start to be granted until the second 
half of the 14th century. In consequence, there were not as 
many nobles and knights with lands in the Kingdom of 
Valencia as in Catalonia and Aragon, and there was not 
such a complex network of vassalage.30
Given this state of affairs, only 27 noblemen and 
knights were summoned to the Courts of Valencia held in 
1301-1302, while almost 40 were summoned to the 1299 
Courts of Catalonia and around 50 to the 1300 Courts of 
Aragon.31 The power differential between the noble class-
es of the different regions can also be seen in the cam-
paign to conquer Almeria in 1309: of the almost 1,300 
knights who came in the different contingents, 48% were 
from Catalonia, 43% from Aragon and only 9% from the 
inherited nobility developed in the Kingdom of Valencia. 
Furthermore, while the leading Catalan and especially 
Aragonese barons summoned retinues upwards of 30 
armed horses, the Valencians had no more than fifteen.32 
In fact, among those summoned to the aforementioned 
1301-1302 Courts of Valencia, with the exception of a few 
nobles with close ties to the Crown such as Bernat de Sar-
rià, the only ones who were truly powerful were from the 
royal family itself, such as Jaime de Xèrica and Pedro 
Fernández de Híjar, the sons of James I, and Jaime Pérez 
de Sogorb, the son of Peter the Great, whose domains also 
spanned Valencia and Aragon. In this sense, there was an 
overwhelming majority of noblemen and knights from 
Aragonese families, 19 to 27 of them, compared to just 
five with Catalan roots and three from elsewhere, includ-
ing Sicily (the Llúria and Pròixida families) and Genoa 
(the Carròs family).
In fact, as outlined above, the conflict over the applica-
tion of the Fueros de Aragón or the Furs de València in 
the Kingdom of Valencia was the prime dispute that col-
oured political relations among the nobility, the Crown 
and the royal estate from the Courts of 1261 until the 
Courts of 1329-1330. During that entire period, much of 
the noble estate, most of whom were from Aragon, led by 
the successive Barons of Xèrica with the support of the 
nobility of Aragon, remained united in defence of their 
own laws. Until that date, they refused to approve the new 
Furs de València in the Courts and to fiscally contribute 
to the Crown like the other Valencian estates; however, 
after the agreement reached at that time the vast majority 
of noblemen and knights joined the political workings of 
the Kingdom. Only a handful of magnates, especially 
those who held baronies on the border between Valencia 
and Aragon such as the Barons of Xèrica, Luna, Arenós 
and Urrea, continued to apply the Fueros de Aragón, so 
although their alliance remained steadfast, it no longer 
extended throughout the majority of the noble estate.33
In consequence, after 1330 the majority of the nobility 
in favour of the Fueros de Aragón disintegrated, and, in 
fact, the Valencian nobility with Catalan roots began to 
grow until becoming the majority when the Courts were 
called in the mid-14th century. This nobility also had 
close ties to the service of the Crown, such as the afore-
mentioned Llúria, Carròs and Pròixida families, as well as 
the Vilanova, Riusec, Boïl, Tous and Escrivà families. 
Others came from urban families of ennobled merchants 
and jurists, such as the Soler, Ripoll, Rabassa and Mar-
rades families, and only a few seemed to behave a bit more 
independently, including the Centelles, Vilaragut, Maça, 
Roís de Corella and Calataiud families. Beyond that, the 
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line of succession of the Xèrica family died out in 1369 
and its main domains were returned to Peter the Ceremo-
nious, who decided to grant them to his younger son, 
Prince Martin, for whom he created the Countship of 
Xèrica in 1372. A few years earlier in 1356, the same mon-
arch had established the first noble title in Valencia, the 
Countship of Dénia, which he granted to his cousin and 
the grandson of James II, Alphonse of Aragon – the elder 
brother of the aforementioned bishop of Valencia. With 
the realm of Gandia and the former possessions of Bernat 
de Sarrià, who had also died without heirs, this became 
the most important barony in the kingdom at the time, 
with more than 10,000 vassals. It was elevated to the 
Duchy of Gandia in 1399.34
All told, given their overall weakness and customary 
dependence on the Crown, it should come as no surprise 
that the vast majority of nobles and knights in Valencia 
supported the royalist side in the revolt of the Union from 
1347-1348 led by the city of Valencia. Still, in addition to a 
series of urban knights, some members of the petty nobil-
ity also joined the movement, a clear sign that since the 
agreement on the Furs there had been deepening inter-
estate ties and a kind of permeability among the urban 
and knightly leaders.35 Indeed, after the resolutions of 
1329-1330, the members of the nobility were able to begin 
participating in the governments of the royal municipali-
ties as justices, mostassafs,36 magistracy and councillors, 
posts which had been off-limits to them until then. In 
fact, it seems that right around this time the nobles and 
knights began to move en masse to the city of Valencia, 
the main site where power was concentrated in the terri-
tory.37 This obviously helped the members of the elites 
gradually engage in politics, yet it did not eliminate the 
struggles among them regarding either the rivalry be-
tween the estates or the material power over each realm.
Specifically, the huge strides in the seigneurialisation of 
the country over the century, along with the tax contribu-
tions required by the Crown to maintain the spiral of war 
campaigns that lasted from the conquest of Sardinia in 
1324 until the end of the war with Castile in 1369, led to 
constant conflicts between the estate of the royal bor-
oughs and the nobility. On the one hand, the increase in 
seigneurial realms both inside and outside the jurisdic-
tional boundaries of the royal municipalities resulted in 
heightened struggles over issues of justice and access to 
material resources; indeed, the use of pasturelands by the 
city of Valencia was the particular focal point of many of 
these disputes, as we shall recount below. On the other 
hand, both the royal estate and the Crown increasingly 
forced the nobility to contribute to the joint military ef-
forts through general subsidies approved in parliamenta-
ry assemblies, a phenomenon which sparked resistance 
but ended up being consolidated with the creation of the 
Diputació del General (General Council) in the 1360s. At 
the same time, there were also many disagreements over 
the urban contribution of the nobles and knights living in 
the royal boroughs, which were usually resolved via taxa-
tion, although their rates were proportionally lower than 
those of the rest of their inhabitants.38
Ultimately, the confluence of rising conflict and the 
gradual integration of the elites from the estates living in 
the city of Valencia yet with landholdings all over the ter-
ritory, without clear cohesion or leadership, ended up 
paving the way for the banditry which would dominate 
the kingdom between the late 14th and early 15th centu-
ries.
The city of Valencia and the royal universities
The Costums de València granted in 1238 were actually 
an extensive municipal code of laws meant for the city 
that James I had just conquered. The monarch intended 
to apply them to all the land he planned to seize, but he 
had not yet occupied all of it nor did all the places he had 
conquered until then follow these laws. In fact, the pro-
logue to the code itself specified that they were “the cus-
toms and establishments of the kingdom and the city of 
Valencia”,39 such that they reserved special attention and 
a series of exclusive powers for the capital. Thus, apart 
from the Crown, the city of Valencia benefitted the most 
from the Costums and, in fact, when that their name be-
came the Furs de València in 1250 a series of privileges 
granted until then to the urbs was added to the code. For 
example, the first chapter of the Furs granted the city a 
huge jurisdictional district measuring more than 600 
square kilometres within which it held vast legal power 
over the privately-held domains nestled within it – in 
contrast to Barcelona’s difficulties in this sense. Likewise, 
the second chapter exclusively granted the inhabitants of 
the city of Valencia total freedom to use pasturelands in 
any part of the entire kingdom, regardless of the realm to 
which it belonged.40
On the other hand, we should bear in mind that the 
power of the city was exclusively held by the families of 
the urban leaders, especially merchants, moneychangers, 
drapers and jurists overwhelmingly with Catalans origins 
who monopolised the magistracies of the government 
from which the nobles and knights were totally excluded. 
The citizens had managed to establish this through a roy-
al privilege in 1245 and it continued, with a brief five-year 
hiatus during the reign of Peter the Great (r. 1276-1285), 
until the agreements of 1329-1330, which partly opened 
justice, the mostassafs, the magistracy and the Municipal 
Council to the nobility.41 Likewise, we should also bear in 
mind that Valencia was far and away the most populous, 
important and wealthy town in the land; it had 20,000 in-
habitants in the 1270s, a figure which only continued to 
grow and which, despite the terrible plague in 1348, 
reached almost 30,000 in the 1360s. By then it must have 
accounted for almost 15% of the total population in the 
kingdom, joined by around 10,000 inhabitants who lived 
in its outskirts. In fact, that was where the complex irriga-
tion system inherited from Al-Andalus was developed to 
maintain the extensive, productive farmlands that nour-
ished and supplied the urban growth.42
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Given this, the role played by the city of Valencia in the 
political system of the kingdom was essential from the 
very start. Its power had reached the point where in 1286 
– 13 years before Barcelona – it managed to release itself 
from the obligation to contribute monetarily to the king 
whenever he requested it, which allowed it to have greater 
margin of action when gaining political compensations in 
fiscal negotiations. What is more, its economic impor-
tance was such that in the numerous subsidies to the 
Crown documented in the mid-14th century, its contri-
bution always accounted for half or more of the total 
granted by the royal estate.43 In line with this, Valencia 
initially held a clear leadership position within its estate, 
especially during the dispute over the Furs versus the 
Fueros, given that all the royal villages were governed by 
the Furs de València with the exception of Borriana, 
which was populated under the Fuero de Aragón in 1233, 
and Vila-real, founded within the township of Borriana 
several decades later, until they renounced it at the Courts 
of 1329-1330. Likewise, all the gatherings of the Courts 
until the mid-14th century were always held in the city of 
Valencia itself, and even in the general subsidies granted 
during the 1330s and 1340, the capital acted as a separate 
estate, with its own deputies and administrators different 
to those of the nobility, the Church and the other royal 
boroughs.
In fact, until then Valencia was the only town in the 
kingdom with the rank of city – apart from Sogorb, which 
was usually held by important barons – and it fashioned 
itself, as it did throughout the entire era of the Furs, as the 
“mother of all cities and villages in the Kingdom” and as 
the “mother and head of the entire kingdom”.44 However, 
that situation of absolute pre-eminence and leadership 
would shift after the revolt of the Union, led by the capital 
in 1347 with the support of the majority of the royal estate 
but opposed by two of the most important towns in the 
Kingdom, Morella and Xàtiva. In fact, at the end of the 
conflict, Xàtiva was rewarded by Peter the Ceremonious 
with the title of city, despite the repeated protests of the 
Valencian leaders.45 In this sense, within the context of a 
constant loss of members through the Crown’s disposals 
of assets throughout the century, the skeleton of the royal 
estate was made up not only of the city of Valencia but 
also seven main towns, namely Xàtiva, Morella, Morve-
dre, Alzira, Castelló de la Plana, Oriola and Alicante, as 
well as a few that were not quite as large, including Borri-
ana, Vila-real, Bocairent, Ademús, Alpont, Castellfabib 
and Castalla.
They stood alongside the leaders of Valencia in its de-
fence of the Furs de València and the integrity of the royal 
assets numerous times, but they also clashed in an in-
creasingly open fashion over the city’s aspirations to im-
pose its power over the entire estate and the kingdom. In a 
parliamentary assembly held in 1321, for example, the 
town representatives asked to have the same “graces, 
franchises and freedoms” as Valencia, but James II denied 
their request: “because there is a reason why the city has 
more prerogatives than the towns of the kingdom”.46 
What is more, as mentioned above, the unity of the es-
tate’s action was clearly shattered during the revolt of the 
Union, and the outcome of the conflict with the victory of 
the Crown heralded a major revision and reduction of the 
capital’s privileges in 1349, which would remain in force 
until 1382.47 In fact, during the second half of the century, 
we can detect a shift in the families who held the power in 
the capital, with slightly more participation by the knights 
and a closure of the routes of participation and decision-
making on the Municipal Council, which must have 
helped spark the revival of banditry.48 At the same time, 
in the 1390s, while Valencia was increasing its direct sei-
gneurial power by adding Morvedre and Cullera, which it 
gained after the war with Castile concluded, the personal 
assets of the Prince Martí, which included the Countship 
of Xèrica, a series of royal boroughs with Xàtiva at the 
helm formed a league with the noble estate and Church to 
deal with the capital’s interventionism in the use of the 
kingdom’s natural resources.49
The main bone of contention was the issue of the use of 
the pasturelands, which, as noted above, were freely avail-
able around the entire kingdom for the inhabitants of the 
city of Valencia. The only exception was the bovalars, 
which were zones exclusively reserved for the livestock of 
each realm, delimited with the supervision of the Crown. 
There was a constant spate of lawsuits, and Valencia actu-
ally established a court of its own to issue rulings; more 
than 300 cases were brought before this court in barely 
three years during the mid-14th century and they in-
volved more than 90 different towns all around the king-
dom. Given this, the capital had to deal with members of 
the royal and other estates. For example, in 1380 Xàtiva, 
Morella and Alzira undertook joint lawsuits against this 
situation, while in 1395 the militias of the city of Valencia 
occupied the viscounty of Xelva – the third largest title in 
the kingdom, created just a few years earlier – and dispos-
sessed its lord, Pedro Ladrón de Vilanova, over an issue 
related to the transit of livestock. Finally, in 1403 King 
Martin issued an arbitral ruling in the Valencian Courts 
which confirmed the inhabitants of Valencia’s privilege 
over the pasturelands, but he made the conditions more 
stringent, regulated the procedure in the event of conflict 
in greater detail and established the need to signal the 
bovalars of all the towns in the kingdom.50
Yet the conflicts continued to mount, and it should 
come as no surprise that while the city of Valencia de-
clared itself in favour of Urgell during the Interregnum of 
1410-1412, Xàtiva, Morella and Morvedre took the side of 
the Trastámaras. As is common knowledge, this dispute 
escalated to unleash a civil war in Valencia.51 In short, 
throughout the 14th century, the royal estate went from 
unity and indisputable leadership of the capital to frag-
mentation and confrontation among some of its leading 
members, who also sought the support of the noble and 
Church lords in yet another display of the gradual mutual 
interaction and involvement of the political actors as the 
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century wore on. Valencia’s dream of imposing its will 
over the entire kingdom, bolstered by the privileges that 
James I sought to grant it in the mid-13th century, was 
strongly questioned throughout the entire 14th century. 
Yet at the same time, it grew and gained ground as the 
political, social and economic capital of a land which 
showed major integration: it was the seat of the leading 
institutions, the place of residence of the elites and the nu-
cleus that concentrated the most mercantile, military and 
financial enterprises. Yet this consolidation in no way 
staved off conflict; instead, it was an essential, intrinsic 
factor in the very process.
The events and political development 
Generally speaking, the 14th century can be divided into 
three main phases in the politics of the Crown of Aragon. 
The first one approximately corresponds to the reign of 
James II (r. 1291-1327), which was characterised by a 
stage in which the affairs triggered by the conquest of Sic-
ily in the 1280s were resolved, along with a kind of politi-
cal appeasement and deepening of the institutional foun-
dations of royal power. The second one spanned the 
central decades of the century, more or less from the con-
quest of Sardinia in 1324 until the end of the war with 
Castile in 1369. It was shaped by a constant succession of 
wars against external enemies – such as the Sardinians, 
the Genovese, the Nassarites, the Marinids and the Castil-
ians – and by the revolt of the Union in Aragon and Va-
lencia internally, as well as by the acceleration in the pro-
cess of constructing a stable general tax system mediatised 
by the leaders of the estates via the Courts. Finally, the 
third phase came in the last third of the century, when the 
different members of political society struggled intensely 
for control over the political and institutional system that 
resulted from the changes that had taken place in the pre-
vious stages.
Obviously, these sweeping general stages were ex-
pressed uniquely in each territory according to its own 
socio-political conditions. In the case of the Kingdom of 
Valencia, the first phase was totally dominated by the dis-
pute over the Furs de València versus the Fueros de 
Aragón, even though James II had managed to partly mit-
igate it after reaching the throne by his recognition in the 
Courts of 1292 that the Furs de València should be gen-
eral for the entire land but that there was a series of lords 
and realms which had the special privilege of using the 
Fueros de Aragón. In any event, that situation was not the 
parties’ desired state of affairs, and the clash lay dormant, 
as seen in the outcome of the subsequent Courts of 1301-
1302: the chapters on justice approved were not incorpo-
rated into Valencia’s body of law, nor was the subsidy ap-
proved managed generally and shared by all the estates. 
Instead, the royal universities granted one while the no-
bles and knights granted another much smaller donation 
exclusively meant to wipe out the debts that the Crown 
had with them, in contrast to the parallel Courts in Cata-
lonia and Aragon, where the subsidies granted were man-
aged by both estates in a mixed, joint fashion.
What is more, while the Courts in Catalonia and 
Aragon met up to seven times during the reign of James 
II, in Valencia there were only four parliamentary assem-
blies because of the clash between the supporters of the 
Furs de València and the Fueros de Aragón. In fact, in the 
Courts of Valencia of 1314 and 1325, no legislative or fis-
cal agreements were reached because of the open wound 
over this dispute. James II tried to heal it in 1321 by sum-
moning the main parties involved in the conflict, but no 
agreement was reached despite the repeated rounds of ne-
gotiation. Later, in 1326, after nine months of assemblies 
and treaties, the defenders of the Furs de València and the 
Fueros de Aragón reached an agreed-upon solution with 
the assistance of the Bishop of Valencia. However, it was 
never put into place because of the illness and death of 
Jaume II shortly thereafter.52 Likewise, his governing ac-
tions gave rise to two important events in the political his-
tory of the Kingdom of Valencia. The first was the con-
quest of the lands in Murcia near Oriola between 1296 
and 1304, their incorporation into the territory and their 
joining the jurisdiction of Valencia via their own attorney 
general. The second was the creation of the Order of 
Montesa in 1319 with the assets of the vanished Templars 
in Valencia, coupled with the vast majority of possessions 
of the Order of the Hospital, which came to be owned by 
masters faithful to the Crown such as Arnau de Soler 
(1319-1327), tutor of the eldest son of James II, Pere de 
Tous (1327-1374), Albert de Tous (1374-1382) and Be-
renguer March (1382-1409).53
Therefore, it was not until the reign of Alphonse the 
Benign in the Courts of 1329-1330 that a solution to the 
issue of the Furs versus the Fueros was found, a milestone 
which launched a new political era in the Kingdom of Va-
lencia. Only a handful of magnates kept the Fueros de 
Aragón, while the vast majority adapted to the Furs de 
València during the 1330s and 1340s, as the capital and 
most of the royal estate had insistently been pursuing 
since the 13th century with the support of the Crown. 
Nonetheless, that was precisely when the differences be-
tween the city of Valencia and the monarchs were cata-
pulted into the foreground, beginning with the gradual 
disposal of the royal assets. Despite the promise secured 
from James II in 1319 – immediately after his eldest son, 
James the Senseless, refused to marry and inherit the 
throne – not to divide the territories of the Crown or give 
up its direct domains, the fact is that numerous royal bor-
oughs were transferred thereafter. Gandia, Dénia, Pego, 
Corbera and Elx were given to his sons Pere, Joan and Ra-
mon Berenguer during the reign of James II himself; and 
Morella, Xàtiva, Morvedre, Alzira, Castelló de la Plana, 
Oriola, Alicante and Guardamar were given during the 
reign of Alphonse the Benign to his wife, Queen Elionor 
of Castile, the last three towns to their son, the Infant Fer-
dinand.
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That clash led first to the mutiny led by the jurist of Va-
lencia Francesc de Vinatea in late 1331 and later to the 
persecution of Queen Elionor of Castile upon the death of 
Alphonse the Benign and the accession to the throne 
of their first son, Peter the Ceremonious in 1336. Elionor 
was defended by Baron Pedro de Xèrica, who maintained 
the Fueros de Aragón within Valencian territory, and the 
issue was not solved until the Courts of 1339, which con-
firmed the cessions made to the Infant Ferdinand but the 
return to the royal assets of the ones transferred to the 
queen. Despite this, the expansionist and military policy 
of the Crown led Peter the Ceremonious to dispose of 
many more assets and to considerably increase the fiscal 
pressure on the royal boroughs, which had to resort to 
municipal debt for the first time. Furthermore, his au-
thoritarian behaviour, especially after the 1344 incorpo-
ration of the councillors from Roussillon from the court 
of James III of Mallorca, who disdained and avoided the 
code of laws of the Furs de València, sparked the revolt of 
the Union in 1347, led by the city of Valencia with the 
support of much of the royal estate – except Morella, Xà-
tiva, Borriana, Vila-real, Ademús and Alpont – and the 
popular echelons of many noble and Church estates.54
In fact, the royalist fraternity which was organised 
against them, and which sparked a civil clash, was led by 
none other than Pedro de Xèrica, now serving Peter the 
Ceremonious, the Master of Montesa Pere de Tous and 
other nobles like Gonzalo Díaz de Arenós, Alfons Roger 
de Llúria and Gilabert de Centelles. After a year and a half 
of conflict – simultaneous to the revolt of the Union that 
had emerged in Aragon, which was, however, aristocratic 
– the rebellion in Valencia was totally crushed and the 
monarch imposed severe economic penalties, namely the 
payment of ten-year taxes which consolidated the spread 
of the indirect taxes and public debt on the local scale, 
along with political penalties, with a reduction in privi-
leges, the direct intervention of the magistracies from the 
city of Valencia and the monarch’s refusal to call the 
Courts of Valencia.55 This situation, however, was com-
pletely wiped out after the start and development of the 
war against Castile between 1356 and 1369, which led to 
the appearance of the Diputacions del General in Catalo-
nia, Aragon and Valencia to manage the collection and 
administration of the huge general subsidies needed to 
organise the defence of the land against the constant, 
multiple attacks from the troops of Peter the Cruel.56
In fact, in Valencia the Diputació del General was the 
crystallisation of temporary bodies that had previously 
existed. While in Catalan and Aragonese lands, the nobil-
ity had refused to grant any subsidy to the monarch for 
over half a century – since the Courts from the beginning 
of the 14th century – the Valencian nobility had granted 
them after the agreements of 1329-1330, initially through 
a five-year subsidy granted in those same Courts, and lat-
er with another three-year subsidy approved in the Courts 
of 1340, which was managed by deputies of the nobility, 
the Church, the city of Valencia and the royal towns. In 
this sense, it is likely that the new situation of the estates 
intermingling and the relative weakness of the nobility 
made this possible. Regardless, when the conflagration 
with the Castilians came, the Crown, whose assets had 
been weakened by the process of disposals associated with 
previous wars, had to resort to the assistance of its sub-
jects and accept frequent Courts and the estates’ manage-
ment of the subsidies in order to conserve the integrity of 
its domains. Indeed, from 1358 until 1401, the Valencians 
held up to twelve different assemblies of the Courts.57
In any event, after the utter turmoil unleashed by the 
conflict against Castile had subsided, there were still other 
wars – against the French, Sardinians and Genovese – but 
at a pace that was not as challenging to the Crown. Given 
this, a new period got underway in which the political so-
ciety of each territory interacted with the institutions and 
the composition of power that had coalesced previously.58 
In the case of Valencia, as explained above, both the jus-
tices and the royal officials had increased their activity, 
while some posts that until then had been centralised be-
gan to be decentralised. At the same time, the question of 
the Furs versus the Fueros had ceased being a prime issue, 
and, in fact, the nobility had no longer primarily Aragon-
ese origins, while the city of Valencia had gradually come 
into focus as the main hub of political, economic and so-
cial power throughout the entire kingdom. As discussed 
above, the capital itself had ceased being the uncontested 
leader of the royal estate and was subjected to a process of 
oligarchisation of its leaders after the revolt of the Union. 
The Diputació del General, on the other hand, had opened 
another front of power that the different political agents 
sought to control, while the courts of the king and the 
prince and the posts that depended on them grew steadily.
In fact, the Courts in the last third of the 14th century 
particularly strove to define and outline the competences of 
the royal officials such as the governor, the general bailiff 
and the justices, while also trying to keep watch over or 
challenge the curiae, councillors and advisors surrounding 
the monarchs and heirs to the Crown, who, as stated in the 
General Courts of Montsó of 1383, “are like wild mush-
rooms, growing quickly in little time”.59 As a whole, the po-
litical society and institutionalised power associated with 
both the Crown and the kingdom had grown, and rather 
than being attacked or disputed as they had been in the 
past, they were the object of attempts to control them by 
the leading elites. The latter had also been forging family or 
political bonds in an increasingly malleable way, such that 
the direct clashes among the estates noted until 1330 had 
been replaced by an array of more open, varied alliances. In 
short, the conflicts were no longer targeted as much at try-
ing to change or contradict the existing structures as at try-
ing to shape and control the mechanisms of a political and 
institutional system that was increasingly consolidated and 
entrenched around the territory as a whole.
This is how banditry came to dominate the Kingdom of 
Valencia during the last quarter of the 14th century – and 
even until the enthronement of Ferdinand of Trastámara 
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in 1412 – in its fierce struggle to seize the trades and posts 
in the royal milieu, the government of the kingdom and 
the urban magistracies. Specifically, the elites were divid-
ed into two main factions, one led by Vilaragut, Soler, 
Boïl, Tous and Marrades, and another by Centelles, Díaz, 
Vilanova, Pròixida and Pardo de la Casta. The latter was a 
bit more aristocratic and also occasionally supported by 
the main magnates in the region: both the brothers Alfons 
and Jaume d’Aragó, that is, the Count of Dénia and the 
Bishop of Valencia, and the Master of Montesa, Berengu-
er March. In fact, those two major factions were the ones 
that politically harnessed the support of the top pretend-
ers to the succession upon the death of Martin the Hu-
mane in 1410: Count Jaume II of Urgell, who had the as-
sistance of the former, and the Infante of Castile 
Ferdinand de Trastámara, who was favoured by the latter. 
Indeed, the Interregnum led to a new civil war in the 
Kingdom of Valencia in which the pro-Urgell faction was 
in the majority in the city of Valencia and among much of 
the royal estate, while, just like during the revolt of the 
Union, the pro-Trastámara side had the support of Xàtiva 
and Morella, the two main royal boroughs which ques-
tioned the hegemony of the capital.60
Ultimately, the political instability shown by Valencian 
society at that time was quite different to the instability 
that had existed in the 13th century and the first half of 
the 14th century, which was less cross-cutting. It was 
somehow an instability caused by the growth, develop-
ment and gradual spread of the institutions of governance 
and administration in all spheres. In any event, that pro-
cess was mediatised by the very historical evolution and 
particular characteristics of the territory of Valencia, in-
cluding a weak nobility compared to Catalonia and 
Aragon, a pre-eminent role of the Crown favoured by the 
Furs de València, and the city of Valencia’s steadfast bid 
for leadership, as it sought to impose its power over the 
kingdom as a whole. Regardless, by the early 15th century 
nobody could dispute the political integrity of the territo-
ry or its institutional and legal entity; to the contrary, they 
all struggled to occupy its power structures and speak on 
behalf of the kingdom and all Valencians, a collective self-
awareness which, in fact, ended up exploding throughout 
that other century.61
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